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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
There is an appalling lack of authority on the problem of whether
there can be a subsequent liability on an owner of chattels cast ashore
by an Act of God. Regardless of how this problem is resolved it does
not appear that the case will be ripe for a limitation of liability. If there
is a subsequent liability the defendant will be faced with privity or
knowledge; if there is not a liability there is no cause to limit.20
WALTON K. JOYNER
Corporations-Corporate Action for Mismanagement Precluded
Where Sole Stockholder Has No Standing in Equity to Sue
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Burge,1 a recent case of first impression, has
added a third decision to the Park Terrace litigation.2 In the present
case the two defendants had been original shareholders of Park Ter-
race, Inc. The capital structure of the corporation provided that one
class of stock would be called "preferred." All the shares of this class
were held by the Federal Housing Administration. In addition there
were two other classes of stock, Class A and Class B. The Class B
"0 "The doctrine of limitation of liability presupposes that a liability exists
which is to be limited, but if no liability exists, there is nothing to limit." In the
Matter of Cherokee Trawler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 414, 419 (E.D. Va. 1957).
1249 N.C. 308, 106 S.E.2d 478 (1959). Action was commenced on November
3, 1953.
'The first case, Lester v. McLean, 242 N.C. 390, 87 S.E.2d 886 (1955), in-
volved a claim of alleged fraud raised by McLean as a defense to an action
brought by the two defendants in the principal case to recover the purchase price
of the Class A stock. The court found that there had been no fraud and rendered
judgment against McLean.
The second case, Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473,
85 S.E.2d 677 (1955), remanded on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956),
concerned an action brought by the corporation against a building construction
company owned by the two defendants in the principal case for alleged failure
to build the housing in accordance with FHA specifications. On rehearing the
court handed down a unique opinion stating that the legal entity of the corpora-
tion was suspended when the number of stockholders was reduced to less than three.
This decision was widely criticized. Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the
One- and Two-Mat Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956). After this de-
cision the North Carolina Legislature enacted a statute which provided that the
existence of a corporation was not impaired by the acquistion of all the shares by
one or two persons. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (Supp. 1957). N.C. Sess. Laws
1957, ch. 550, § 31/2, in referring to the amending act, provides: "This Act shall
not affect adjudicated rights." In light of this provision, it seems possible to
argue that the legal entity of Park Terrace, Inc. was suspended for all purposes
by the decision in Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix, vtupra, and thus that the
"corporation" would have no standing to bring this present action. However, it
is submitted that § 3r2 was included only to preclude relitigation by the "corpora-
tion" against Phoenix, and was not intended to affect its status with respect to
other rights. Thus, Park Terrace, Inc. would be deemed to have had "uninter-
rupted existence and to have possessed uninterrupted capacity to act as a corpora-
tion" in all respects, limited only by the fact that the corporation's rights have been
adjudicated as against Phoenix.
' In this manner FHA could step in and control the corporation in the event
of default in the mortgage which it insured. Upon payment of the mortgage
debt, the preferred stock could be redeemed at any time by the corporation.
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stock was called common stock, but in fact it was set up with the
characteristics of preferred.4 Under the charter the Class A was the
only true common stock, and it was given exclusive voting privileges. 5
Each of the defendants owned one third of the A stock, and both of
them were directors of the corporation. The remaining A stock was
held by another party who was the third director. In 1950,6 the two
defendants also held all the outstanding shares of Class B stock, the
subscription price of which had never been fully paid. Pursuant to a
unanimous vote by the directors, the corporation repurchased and can-
celled all the outstanding B stock for an amount in excess of the original
par value subscription price.7 Circumstances indicated that the pay-
ment of this price was against the best interests of the corporation.
Subsequently, in 1951, McLean inspected the corporate properties and
purchased all of the Class A common stock.
This action was brought in the name of the corporation to recover
the entire amount paid to defendants for repurchase of their B stock.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants, as former directors, had breached
their fiduciary duty to the corporation. No creditors' rights were
involved. FHA, the preferred stockholder, was not a party to this
action and had never complained of any of the defendants' activities.,
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendants' motion for non-
suit was granted. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court held that
where, for several reasons, the sole shareholder is prohibited from
bringing a derivative action, the corporation itself may not maintain the
'The Class B stock was given preferences both as to liquidation and to divi-
dends, while it was deprived of any voting rights.
'These voting rights were subject, however, to the right of FHA to assume
exclusive voting control should the corporation ever be in default in its mortgage
payments.
'The facts in this case arose under the old North Carolina Corporation Act.
However, there appears to be no change in the new act that would modify the
rationale of the principal case. Logically, then, a similar cause of action arising
after July 1, 1957, would be treated in the same manner.
'The repurchase price paid by the corporation was $221,000. This was
$27,558 more than the par value of the stock. See Park Terrace, Inc. v. Burge,
249 N.C. 308, 311, 106 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1959). In their brief, defendants claim
that the price paid to them was not excessive because they had given the corpora-
tion land appraised at a value of $60,000 in return for stock with a par value of
only $23,660; also because the construction company owned by defendants had
made two voluntary reductions in the contract price for the buildings totalling
$146,774. Brief for Appellee, p. 10. However, it is interesting to.note that de-
fendants, acting as directors, refused to repurchase for an offered price of $500
the 70,151 shares of B stock (par value of $70,151) which had been given to the
architect in partial payment for his services. Subsequently, defendants indi-
vidually bought the stock for $500, and these shares were included in the stock
which was later sold to the corporation for a price in excess of par value. These
facts point to the underlying philosophical problem involved in the Park Terrace
litigation, ie., the intrinsic difficulty of applying a corporation act, designed to
regulate large widely held corporations, to a small close corporation.
' The record of the trial court discloses that FHA was at all times informed
as to the stock transactions and financial status of the corporation. Record,
pp. 48-53.
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cause of action in its own name since all proceeds recovered by it would
inure to the benefit of the ineligible shareholder. 9
In disregarding the separate corporate entity, the court relied heavily
upon the leading case of Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber,'° which sets
forth the following doctrine:
When a corporation comes into equity and seeks equitable relief,
we ought to look at the substance of the proceeding, and, if the
beneficiaries of the judgment sought have no standing in equity
to recover, we ought not to become befogged by the fiction of
corporation individuality, and apply the principles of equity to
reach an inequitable result."
It appears from the decision in the principal case that the Home
Fire doctrine has been unequivocably adopted in this jurisdiction. It
becomes important, therefore, to examine the conditions which rendered
the sole shareholder in the principal case so devoid of any standing in
equity that suit by the corporation was precluded in order to prevent his
indirect participation in the recovery. These conditions were: (1)
McLean was not a stockholder at the time of the transaction on which
the claim is based, (2) he had obtained his shares by voluntary purchase
and not by operation of law, (3) the stock that McLean held was
"guilty" stock, the former owners of which had participated in the
alleged wrong. In addition to these three disqualifying factors, the
action was not brought by the corporation for the benefit of creditors
or for the purpose of asserting or endeavoring to protect a title to
property, but solely as a suit in equity as the representative of its sole
stockholder.' 2
It is a well established rule that one who was not a stockholder
at the time of the transaction of which he complains has no standing to
bring a derivative action in the federal courts.' 8 This limitation, known
'At the outset of its opinion, the court stated: "Therefore, the plaintiff
corporation had no stockholders with voting rights other than those who as
officers and directors authorized the purchase by the corporation of the B stock
from these defendants. Consequently, it would seem that neither the plaintiff
corporation nor the holders of the A stock could thereafter attack the validity
of the transaction unless the corporation in doing so was acting in behalf of
creditors." 249 N.C. at 312, 106 S.E.2d at 481. This would imply that no
wrong had ever been done to the corporation. However, the court did not decide
the case on this ground, but based its decision upon the rationale that the lack of
equitable standing on the part of the sole shareholder precluded suit in the
corporate name regardless of the merits of the question as to whether or not
the corporation had ever been wronged.
1 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
" Id. at 669, 93 N.W. at 1033.
1" When the corporation sues upon legal titles or rights, the distinction of
entities is observed, but when it sues upon equities of the whole body of stock-
holders the courts look to their equities. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41
(perm. ed. 1931).
13 This rule was originally established to prevent collusive transfers in order
to get a corporate controversy into a federal court on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. Domz, FEDEAL PRocEUREn § 175 (1928) ; 25 VA. L. REv. 100 (1938).
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as the contemporaneous ownership rule, was inaugurated by the federal
courts in the case of Hawes v. Oakland,1 4 and has since been enacted
into Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). 15 A number of states
have passed similar statutes,16 and several states have adopted the rule
by way of decisional law.17  North Carolina has sometimes been included
in this latter classification by text writers.'8 However, this would seem
to be erroneous since the precise question has never been directly passed
on in this jurisdiction.19
In some states the rule is well settled that a stockholder may bring
a derivative action even though he purchased his shares after the transac-
tion complained of.2 0  It is not certain as to which is the majority view
because many of the cases in which the contemporaneous ownership
rule is said to apply have rested upon fundamental principles of equity,21
and the shareholder could have been precluded from maintaining the
suit-because of participation, acquiescence, estoppel or laches-without
relying on the theory that the shareholder was barred merely because
his stock was purchased subsequent to the alleged wrong.
One New York case22 has gone so far as to extend the contemporane-
" 104 U.S. 450 (1881).1 Authorities have held that rule 23(b) is procedural rather- than substantive.
FLErCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATiONS § 5943 (perm. ed. 1943).16E.g., 24 CALIF. CORP. CODE § 834; 4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1953);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-16 (Supp. 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 1321 (1953).
Boldenwick v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907); News-Journal
Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941); Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga.
536, 8 S.E. 630 (1889) ; Goldberg v. Ball, 305 I1. App. 273, 27 N.E.2d 575 (1940) ;
Clark v. American Coal Co., 86 Iowa 436, 53 N.W. 291 (1892); Jepsen v.
Peterson, 69 S.D. 388, 10 N.W.2d 749 (1943); Pitcher v. Lone Pine Surprise
Consol. Min. Co., 39 Wash. 608, 81 Pac. 1047 (1905).
Sykes, Right of Stockholder To Attack Transactions Occurring Prior to His
Acquisitiot of Stock, 4 MD. L. REv. 380, at 381 (1940).
.The derivative action involving this problem, Moore v. Mining Co., 104
N.C. 534, 10 S.E. 679 (1889), was ultimately decided on the grounds that the
party seeking to bring the action was not shown to be a bona fide stockholder
and was also charged with laches.
In the principal case the court quotes as follows from the Home Fire decision:
'[A] purchaser of stock cannot complain of prior acts and management of the
corporation. . . .' 249 N.C. at 314, 106 S.E.2d at 482. However, this can only
be construed as dictum, and it appears that purchase of the stock subsequent to
the wrong was of no more than secondary importance among the several cir-
cumstances which precluded suit by the corporation because of the lack of equitable
standing on the part of the sole shareholder.
"0 Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403, 8 So. 788 (1891) ; Just v. Idaho Canal &
Improvement Co., 16 Idaho 639, 102 Pac. 381 (1909) ; Mason v. Carrothers, 105
Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1030 (1909) ; Forrester v. Mining Co., 21 Mont 544, 55 Pac. 229(1898) ; North v. Union Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Ore. 483, 117 Pac. 822 (1911) ;
Roberson v. Draney, 53 Utah 263, 178 Pac. 35 (1919) ; Bank of Mill v. Elk Horn
Coal Co., 133 W.Va. 639, 57 S.E.2d 736 (1950).2IE.g., Boldenwick v. Bullis, 40 Colo, 253, 90 Pac. 634 (1907) (transferor
had participated in the wrong, and laches); Alexander v. Searcy, 81 Ga. 536,
8 S.E. 630 (1889) (acquiescence and laches); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber,
67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903) (transferor had participated in the wrong).
22 Capital Wine and Spirit Corp. v. Porkrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d
291 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd without opinion, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951).
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ous ownership rule to bar a suit by the corporation itself. This decision
has been severely criticized.2 The concurring opinion24 of the
presiding justice seems to have based the result of the decision upon the
more logical ground that the sole shareholder had bought the corporation
on the basis of disclosed assets, and to permit the corporation to sue
under these circumstances would be inequitable in that it would allow
the shareholder to recover more than he had bargained and paid for.
It seems very doubtful whether stock ownership acquired subsequent
to the wrong, by itself, should be sufficient reason to justify disregarding
the corporate entity when the corporation is suing in its own name to
recover for prior mismanagement. 25
The second disqualifying factor-that McLean obtained his stock
through voluntary purchase after inspection of the corporation property,
rather than by operation of law-appears to be of much greater signifi-
cance. Concerning this, our court stated: "To allow the plaintiff
corporation to recover the consideration it paid to the defendants for
the B stock would, in substance, allow the present stockholders of the
plaintiff corporation to recover an amount in excess of the sum M. P.
McLean, Jr., paid these defendants .... -2 The true nature of his
right and remedy was an individual action against the transferors of
the stock for misrepresentation, or for breach of guarantee.27  Such a
claim had already been litigated and decided against McLean.28  The
courts should not allow a stock purchase grievance between the trans-
feror and the transferee to be litigated in the corporate name merely
because the grievant has acquired the controlling interest in the corpora-
tion. There has been no other case in North Carolina presenting this
situation. However, the courts which have had occasion to pass upon
this question have held in accord with the principal decision, that the
shareholder is not entitled to avail himself of the corporation to secure
for himself, through that medium, more than he bought.29
The fact that the stock purchased by McLean was "guilty" stock
which had participated in the alleged wrong appears very important
in the court's decision. This factor is closely related to the stock
purchase'grievance discussed above. It is well settled that a shareholder
This involved a New York statute, N.Y. GEN. CoaP. LAW § 61, which is similar
to FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (b).23 Note, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 740 (1951) ; Comment, 65 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1951);
Comment, STAN. L. REv. 151 (1950) ; Comment, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 166 (1950).
Capital Wine and Spirit Corp. v. Porkrass, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (Peck, J.,
concurring opinion).
2Authority cited note 22 supra.
249 N.C. at 313, 106 S.E.2d at 482.
Capital Wine and Spirit Corp. v. Porkrass, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 at 297 (1st
Dep't 1950).28Lester v. McLean, 242 N.C. 390, 87 S.E.2d 886 (1955).
" Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 Atl. 645 (1917);
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
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who himself has participated in the alleged wrongful conduct cannot
thereafter attack it; 80 and, generally, subsequent purchasers of stock
stand in no better position than their transferors.31 Thus, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that the transferee cannot sue if he
has acquired his title from a shareholder who participated or acquiesced
in the wrong 3 2  However, where the shareholder was an innocent
purchaser for value who had' no notice of such participation or consent
by his transferor, such an action has been allowed. 83 There is no men-
tion in the principal decision whether or not McLean was aware of the
circumstances surrounding the repurchase of the B stock. Presumably,
he had access to all the financial records prior to his purchase of the
corporation. It seems unlikely that any claim could be made that he
did not have either actual or constructive notice. If the transferee of
all the outstanding stock is barred from bringing an individual action
because he has purchased "guilty" stock from the transferor, it would
be clearly a perversion of justice to allow him to recover through use
of the corporate form.34
It should be noted that the decision in the principal case has no
effect upon the rights of creditors. The court emphasized the fact that
creditors are in a protected category and would have had the right to
enforce the payment of the original subscription price by way of a
creditor's bill in equity.
3 5
The result achieved in the principal case seems analogous to those
decisions which prevent an individual from doing business as a corpora-
tion in a field in which he had personally agreed not to compete,38 or
which refuse to allow a corporate recovery on a fire insurance policy
where the sole shareholder had deliberately set fire to the property in
order to collect the insurance.3 7 The decisions in these and all similar
cases are founded on the basic premise that a shareholder should not
30 Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954); FLETCHER,
PRIVATE CoRPoRON os § 5862 (perm. ed. 1943).
" Russell v. Louis Melind Co., 331 Ill. App. 182, 72 N.E.2d 869 (1947);
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5866 (perm. ed. 1943).
-Ibid.
"Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala. 403, 8 So. 788 (1891). See also Continental
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 83 Misc. 340, 144 N.Y. Supp. 801 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
" Matthews v. Headley, 130 Md. 523, 100 Atl. 645 (1917).
" 249 N.C. at 313, 106 S.E.2d at 481. The court cited N.C. GEN. STAT. §
55-65 (1950), which provides that holders of unpaid stock are liable for so much
of the full amount of the shares as is needed to satisfy creditors. Under the new
act the comparable section is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53 (Supp. 1955), which would
cover situations arising after July 1, 1957.
"Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490 (1875); Kramer v. Old, 119 N.C. 1, 25 S.E.
813 (1896); A. Booth & Co. v. Siebold, 37 Misc. 101, 74 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Sup.
Ct. 1902).
'7Meily Co. v. London & L. Fire Ins. Co., 142 Fed. 873 (E. D. Pa. 1906),
aff'd, 148 Fed. 683 (3rd Cir. 1906); D. I. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assur. Co.,
284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 266 (1918); Kirkpatrick v. Allenama Fire Ins. Co., 102
App. Div. 327, 92 N.Y. Supp. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1905), aff'd, 184 N.Y. 546, 76 N.E.
1098 (1906).
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be allowed to profit in his corporate capacity when he is guilty of some
wrong, or is under some obligation, which would prevent him from so
profiting in his individual capacity.3 8
It is submitted that the result and the rationale of the principal case
are to be commended as a desirable advancement in North Carolina
corporation law. Certainly the ultimate effect of this decision is in line
with the traditional principle that equity will look to the substance of the
proceeding rather than to the form. The courts have consistently utilized
their power to disregard the corporate entity where the sole shareholder
seeks to use his inside position to work fraud or injustice.3 9 The totality
of the circumstances in this case clearly establishes that the sole share-
holder had no equitable standing. Any contrary result would have had
the effect of erecting a statutory shield behind which individuals with
"unclean hands" could enforce their disqualified claims in equity.
SHERWOOD H. SMITH, JR.
Domestic Relations-Alimony Without Divorce and Absolute
Divorce Based on Same Grounds
A wife in Missouri obtained a decree of separate maintenance on the
ground of statutory desertion. Five years later she brought an action
for absolute divorce based on the same ground. Her husband inter-
posed as a defense the doctrine of election of remedies. Held, since an
action for absolute divorce is not inconsistent with an action for separate
maintenance based on the same ground, but is rather an action for further
relief, the doctrine of election of remedies is not applicable. Consequently,
the wife was granted an absolute divorce."
Ordinarily there is no ban on successive divorce actions unless the
doctrine of res judicata may be invoked as a bar thereto.2  For a sub-
sequent action to be precluded it must appear that a court of competent
jurisdiction rendered a final decree on the merits in a prior action in
which the same relief was sought.8 Under this doctrine a decree of
separate maintenance would not be a bar to a subsequent action for
absolute divorce because the two remedies are not the same.4 However,
grounds litigated or questions determined in the separate maintenance
proceeding are res judicata in a subsequent action for absolute divorce.0
Thus, as of its date, a decree in favor of a wife in an action for separate
: Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 332 (1939).
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
41 (perm. ed. 1931).
'Prough v. Prough, 308 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. 1957).
2Meegan v. Meegan, 60 R.I. 131, 197 Atl. 221 (1938).
Bidwell v. Bidwell, 139 N.C. 402, 52 S.E. 55 (1905).
'Jenkins v. Jenkins, 125 Cal. App. 2d 109, 269 P.2d 908 (1954)
'Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952).
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